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Putting Names to Money: Closing Disclosure
Loopholes
GIAN GUALCO-NELSON†
Elections create an opportunity for voters to get to know the candidates, but elections also give
voters the opportunity to get to know their fellow voters. Campaigns are obligated to disclose the
identity of their donors, which can make these donors’ political affiliations known to the world.
Also, the identity of a donor can adversely affect the recipient’s public image and potentially, the
election. These disclosure requirements arguably enable stigmatizing candidates and fellow
voters for their political ideology, but this is offset by the desire to make elections transparent.
In today’s polarized society, the risk of stigma seems greater than in the past—imagine wearing
a MAGA hat in San Francisco or an Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez shirt in rural Alabama—but it
pales in comparison to the need for transparency in elections. After the 2016 Presidential
Election, Democrats and Republicans alike claimed that nefarious actors attempted to influence
the election: be it through foreign interference or election fraud. While there are some disclosure
requirements that help mitigate such influence, the current requirements have several loopholes
that actors use to remain anonymous.
This Note evaluates three of these disclosure loopholes: (1) the 501(c) disclosure exemption for
independent expenditures; (2) the internet loophole for certain electioneering communications;
and (3) the straw-donor laundering loophole. Throughout this analysis, one theme stands out: the
structure of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has crippled the agency’s ability to enforce
disclosure laws. Absent unlikely assistance from Congress, the solution lies with the courts.
Recent judicial decisions portend the possibility of meaningful judicial review of FEC inactions.
While questions remain about whether FEC decisions based on “prosecutorial discretion” are
exempt from judicial review, the Federal Election Commission Act gives the courts authority to
review FEC decisions that are contrary to law. This Note concludes by arguing that FEC
enforcement decisions are not exempt and should be nullified if they are “contrary to law.”

† J.D. Candidate 2020, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Editor-in-Chief, Hastings
Law Journal. Thank you to Emily Tripodi, HLJ’s Executive Production Editor, who has spent countless hours
scrutinizing footnotes and sources to ensure that the Hastings Law Journal publishes high-quality articles. Also,
thank you to Andrea Butler and my family for providing a seemingly endless amount of love and support.
Remaining errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
During the 1972 Presidential election, Maurice Stans served as Finance
Chairman for President Richard Nixon’s Committee for the Reelection of the
President.1 On August 1, 1972, the Washington Post reported that Stans received
a $250,000 cash contribution from President Nixon’s reelection campaign,
which was partially distributed to the Watergate burglars.2 In the wake of the
Watergate Scandal, Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA), in part, to strengthen disclosure requirements and prevent anonymous,
or dark money, in elections.3 Dark money consists of donations from external
donors whose identities are not publicly disclosed.4
Despite these attempts at strengthening electoral transparency, since 1974,
the three branches of government have compromised transparent elections. First,
Congress lost the will to compel political donors to abide by disclosure laws.
Incumbent congressional members largely benefit from loose campaign finance
disclosure laws, and recent Supreme Court decisions have weakened statutorybased disclosure requirements.5 Second, from Buckley v. Valeo to Citizens
United v. FEC,6 the Supreme Court has lifted the gate on unlimited independent
expenditures and muddled the differences between express and issue advocacy.
Third, the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) duties have substantially
changed in the wake of judicial precedents that reshaped the FEC’s
interpretation of the Federal Election Campaign Act.7 More globally, the FEC’s
enabling statute contains a design flaw that requires six appointments that are
evenly split between Democrats and Republicans without any tiebreaker.8 The
commission’s party-split has resulted in partisan deadlock, especially in light of
increased political polarization.9
1. Maurice Stans; Nixon Cabinet Member, Campaign Scandal Figure, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 15, 1998, 12:00
AM), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/apr/15/news/mn-39538.
2. See Reporting Group, Super PACs: How We Got Here, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Jan. 31, 2012, 6:46 AM),
https://sunlightfoundation.com/2012/01/31/super-pacs-how-we-got-here/; The Watergate Story: Timeline,
WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/watergate/timeline.html (last visited Apr.
15, 2020).
3. See Reporting Group, supra note 2; see also Lesley Oelsner, Stans Pleads Guilty to Five Violations of
Election Laws in Campaign of 1972, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 1975), https://www.nytimes.com/1975/03/13/
archives/stans-pleads-guilty-to-five-violations-of-election-laws-in-campaign.html; Mark Stencel, The Reforms,
WASH. POST (June 13, 1997), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/
legacy.htm.
4. See Dark Money Basics, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/dark-money/basics (last visited
Apr. 15, 2020).
5. See infra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
7. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310; McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995);
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1.
8. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(2)(A) (2018).
9. NBC’s investigative task force researched and created a database of past FEC decisions demonstrating
that Democrat appointees vote in a party bloc 87% of the time and Republican appointees vote in a party bloc
98% of the time. See Tisha Thompson, Troll Response Brain Sims, NBC WASH.,
https://www.nbcwashington.com/investigations/Deadlock-FEC-Commissioners-Say-Theyre-Failing-toInvestigate-Campaign-Violations-394014971.html (last updated Feb. 6, 2019, 10:27 PM); see also Dave
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This Note analyzes how the failure of the three branches, particularly the
Executive, in enforcing electoral transparency have enabled three major
loopholes in campaign finance disclosure laws: (1) 501(c) disclosure exemptions
for independent expenditures; (2) internet loopholes for certain electioneering
communications; and (3) the straw-donor laundering loophole. First, this Note
will address the Center for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) v.
FEC (“CREW I”) decision,10 which invalidated the FEC’s regulation exempting
501(c) organizations from disclosing the identities of its donors. The 501(c)
disclosure exemption is a weakness in campaign finance laws, and while
CREW I deters efforts to funnel dark money into elections, there are still several
schemes used to introduce anonymous and untraceable donations. This Note
provides insights into how these gaps can be filled.
Second, 501(c) entities are not subject to any disclaimer or disclosure
requirements for certain electioneering communications published on the
internet. Electioneering communications are public announcements or
advertisements that discuss a potential candidate.11 This Note argues that the
FEC should fill this loophole by amending its definition of “electioneering
communications” to include “public communications.”
Third, this Note analyzes the straw-donor laundering scheme. Many
wealthy donors will create an LLC (“straw donor”) to funnel contributions to
super PACS and 501(c) organizations. This practice allows donors to remain
anonymous, avoid disclosure requirements, and exceed contribution limits. The
Campaign Legal Center, a non-profit that works to promote transparency in
politics, filed several complaints with the FEC alleging straw-donor violations;
however, the FEC chose not to investigate these complaints.12 This trend appears
throughout this Note: the FEC repeatedly chooses not to investigate dangerous
loopholes that threaten transparency, which then forces the courts to step in and
prod the FEC into action. Courts should review the FEC’s decision not to
investigate under the “contrary to law” standard, but recently, the FEC claimed
that decisions based on “prosecutorial discretion” are not subject to judicial
review. And in CREW v. FEC (“CREW II”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit agreed.13 CREW II has generated division within the D.C. Circuit
among judges who believe that FEC decisions based on prosecutorial discretion

Levinthal, Another Massive Problem with U.S. Democracy: The FEC is Broken, ATLANTIC (Dec. 17, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/12/another-massive-problem-with-us-democracy-the-fec-isbroken/282404/; Ann M. Ravel, Dysfunction and Deadlock at the Federal Election Commission, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/opinion/dysfunction-and-deadlock-at-the-federalelection-commission.html.
10. 316 F. Supp. 3d 349 (D.D.C. 2018).
11. Making Electioneering Communications, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/helpcandidates-and-committees/other-filers/making-electioneering-communications/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
12. Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 119 (D.D.C. 2017).
13. CREW v. FEC (CREW II), 892 F.3d 434 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Then-Judge Kavanaugh voted in favor of
the opinion, which indicates how he will vote if this issue reaches the Supreme Court. Id.
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are subject to judicial review.14 Decisions like CREW v. American Action
Network (“AAN”) narrowly construe CREW II so that judicial review still applies
to pretextual uses of “prosecutorial discretion” as a talisman for decisions of law.
I. THE 501(C) PROBLEM
In the 2016 Presidential Election, candidates and outside groups raised over
$2.4 billion.15 Outside groups for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump raised over
forty percent as much cash as their political committees.16 Beyond the immense
amount of money spent, there is a question as to what and who make up these
outside groups.
Outside groups include political action committees (PACs), political party
committees, super PACs, and 501(c) “dark money” organizations.17 A political
party committee represents the political party associated with the candidate, such
as the Democratic National Committee or Republican National Committee.18
PACs are committees established by the candidate but not authorized by the
candidate to accept contributions or make expenditures.19 PACs directly
contribute to a candidate’s campaign, whereas super PACs do not.20 Super PACs
may only make independent expenditures as opposed to direct contributions.21
In 2010, the D.C. Circuit held that contribution limits on independent
expenditure-only groups violated the First Amendment, thereby giving birth to
super PACs.22 Unlike “dark money organizations,” a super PAC must disclose
each of its donors because super PACs spend strictly to influence the outcome
of elections.23
The most controversial of these outside groups are “dark money”
organizations.24 Dark money organizations are certain groups of donors that,
14. See Campaign Legal Ctr. & Democracy 21 v. FEC (Democracy 21), 952 F.3d 352 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(Edwards, J., concurring); see also CREW v. American Action Network (AAN), 410 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C.
2019).
15. 2016 Presidential Race, OPENSECRETS (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16; AlsoRans: 2016 Presidential Race, OPENSECRETS (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/also-rans
(encompassing all candidates who ran in the general and primary election).
16. 2016 Presidential Race, supra note 15. Hillary Clinton’s political committees raised $563,756,928 and
outside groups raised $231,118,680. Donald Trump’s political committees raised $333,127,164 and outside
groups raised $135,719,703. Id.
17. Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/ (last visited Apr. 15,
2020).
18. GREG J. SCOTT & ZAINAB S. SMITH, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
CAMPAIGN GUIDE: POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEES 1 (2013), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cmscontent/documents/partygui.pdf.
19. Types of Nonconnected PACs, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-andcommittees/registering-pac/types-nonconnected-pacs/.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
23. Kim Barker & Marian Wang, Super-PACs and Dark Money: ProPublica’s Guide to the New World of
Campaign Finance, PROPUBLICA (July 11, 2011, 12:38 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/super-pacspropublicas-guide-to-the-new-world-of-campaign-finance.
24. Dark Money, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/dark-money/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
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until recently, were exempt from several campaign finance disclosure
requirements, which meant that they could spend an infinite amount of money
on political campaigns without disclosing their donors.25 In the 2016 presidential
election, dark money groups raised $181.78 million.26 In other words, the public
received $181.78 million worth of election-related information distributed by
people who could be anyone: a neighbor, a board of directors, an issue advocacy
group, a Nazi sympathizer, or even a foreign national.
Under 11 C.F.R. § 109.10, a 501(c) organization must disclose the identity
of its contributors only if the contribution “was made for the purpose of
furthering the reported independent expenditure.”27 This means that a business
could be organized as a 501(c)(4) organization with an alleged social welfare
purpose, like education, to avoid disclosure. A 501(c)(4) could then collect
donations from employees of the business or other individuals who know the
501(c)(4)’s true purpose (advocating for the business) without having to disclose
the donors’ identities. Unless the contributor specifically earmarks the
contribution for express advocacy,28 the 501(c)(4) would not be required to
disclose the identity of the contributor.29
Before CREW I, an entity could protect its donors’ identities through a
surprisingly simple process.30 To avoid disclosure, the entity would first register
with the Internal Revenue Service as a 501(c)(4),31 501(c)(5),32 or 501(c)(6)
organization.33
Theoretically, so long as 51% of the 501(c)(4)’s expenditures are reported
for social welfare purposes, as opposed to “campaign activities,” the
organization can continue to operate as 501(c)(4) and hide the identity of its
donors.34 Politically active social welfare organizations often operate under
“educational” purposes. For example, an educational purpose can include
25. 11 C.F.R. § 109.10 (2020).
26. Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/
nonprof_summ.php?cycle=2018&type=type.
27. 11 C.F.R. § 109.10.
28. Such as a specific independent expenditure.
29. JOHN FRANCIS REILLY & BARBARA A. BRAIG ALLEN, POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AND LOBBYING
ACTIVITIES OF IRC 501(C)(4), (C)(5), AND (C)(6) ORGANIZATIONS, at L-3 (2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/eotopicl03.pdf. The regulation adopts the language in Buckley, where the Court first defined express
advocacy. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976). The FEC considers any language using phrases such
as “vote for the President,” “re-elect your Congressman,” “vote Pro-Life,” or “Nixon’s the one,” as examples of
express advocacy for the election or defeat of a candidate. 11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (1995). Thus, unless individuals
donate to a 501(c)(4) with the express purpose of funding an independent expenditure, 11 C.F.R. § 109.10
permits a 501(c)(4) to serve as a shell to protect the identity of its individual donors.
30. 316 F. Supp. 3d 349 (D.D.C. 2018).
31. 26 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2018) (defining these organizations as social welfare organizations dedicated to
pursuing charitable, educational, or recreational ends).
32. § 501(c)(5) (defining these entities as labor unions).
33. § 501(c)(6) (defining these entities as trade associations including the American Bar Association,
American Medical Association, and American Bankers Association).
34. See Richard Briffault, Super PACS, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1648–49 (2012); Miriam Galston, When
Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of
Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867, 876 (2011).
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informing the public on certain ballot measures, political candidates, and other
contentious issues.35
The following example is illustrative. John Smith runs against incumbent
Jane Node for the United States Senate. Jane benefits from longstanding
financial supporters that have helped her win prior races. However, certain
special interest groups, like pharmaceutical companies, do not like Jane Node’s
policies. A pharmaceutical company approaches John to offer financial support
for his candidacy. The company understands that its support might hurt John’s
public image. Additionally, federal campaign finance laws cap
individual/corporate contributions to campaigns at $2800, and this
pharmaceutical company plans on contributing much more money.36 To
anonymously contribute funds to John’s campaign without contribution caps,
the pharmaceutical company hires a lawyer to create a 501(c)(4) social welfare
organization called “Americans for Advanced Medicine” (AFAM). AFAM’s
social welfare mission statement states that, “AFAM will work at the federal,
state, and local level to mobilize patients to support legislation to help enable
advances in medicine.” As a 501(c)(4), AFAM can engage in an unlimited
amount of lobbying, provided that the lobbying serves AFAM’s social welfare
mission.37 Under § 109.10, AFAM does not have to disclose the identity of its
contributors, unless a contributor earmarks her contribution for a specific
independent expenditure.38 Section 109.10 enables the pharmaceutical company
to donate a large sum to AFAM, who then can spend that money on various
independent expenditures, such as fliers, advertisements, and public outreach.
Prior to CREW I, AFAM did not have to disclose the pharmaceutical
companies’ identities because these companies did not expressly agree that the
funds would be used for the specific independent expenditures (advertisement,
fliers, commercials, etc.).39 However, in CREW I, the D.C. District Court
directed the FEC to expose the human sponsors of dark money organizations.40
However, donors—aided by the FEC’s structural deficiencies—have developed
workarounds to avoid this disclosure mandate by using multiple 501(c) shell
organizations to preserve anonymity, exploiting weak internet disclosure laws
that do not cover certain electioneering communications, and donating through
LLCs that protect shareholder identities.

35. See Dark Money Basics, supra note 4.
36. Contribution Limits: Contribution Limits for 2019-2020 Federal Elections, FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/contribution-limits/
(last
visited Apr. 15, 2020).
37. 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(vi) (2020).
38. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.10; 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9).
39. CREW v. FEC (CREW I), 316 F. Supp. 3d 349, 422 (D.D.C. 2018).
40. Id.
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A. ADDRESSING THE 501(C) PROBLEM IN INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES:
CREW I
In CREW I, CREW brought suit against the FEC and Crossroads
Grassroots Policy Strategies, a 501(c)(4) organization.41 Initially, CREW filed
an administrative complaint against Crossroads alleging that Crossroads
accepted a $3 million contribution to support its work, without disclosing the
contribution in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(2)(C).42 The statute states that
“[s]tatements required to be filed by this subsection . . . shall include . . . the
identification of each person who made a contribution in excess of $200 to the
person filing such statement which was made for the purpose of furthering an
independent expenditure.”43
The FEC dismissed CREW’s complaint, relying on 11 C.F.R. section
109.10(e)(1)(vi), which states that a 501(c) must disclose “[t]he identification of
each person who made a contribution in excess of $200 to the person filing such
report, which contribution was made for the purpose of furthering the reported
independent expenditure.”44 The FEC’s reading of § 109.10 narrowed FECA by
requiring a 501(c) organization to disclose the identity of its contributors who
donated for the purpose of furthering “the reported” independent expenditure, as
opposed to “an” independent expenditure.45
Crossroads and the FEC maintained that § 109.10 only compelled
Crossroads to disclose the identity of its donor if the donor specifically
contributed to Crossroads for a specific independent expenditure, as opposed to
independent expenditures generally.46 The district court disagreed and struck
down the FEC’s regulation, holding that FECA requires 501(c) organizations to
disclose the identity of individuals contributing to further independent
expenditures that expressly advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate for
federal office, without regard to whether the donor contributed to fund a specific
independent expenditure.47
The court applied Chevron’s first step and determined
that § 109.10(e)(1)(vi) conflicted with FECA’s unambiguous language.48 FECA
specifically states that a group must disclose a donor’s identity where the
contribution is “made for the purpose of furthering an independent
expenditure.”49 The court held that “‘an independent expenditure’ means . . . an
unspecified one.”50 The defendants argued that the statute was ambiguous—
specifically that the use of “an independent expenditure” begs the question
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 364.
Id. at 357–59.
52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(2)(C) (2018) (emphasis added).
11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(vi) (emphasis added).
Id.
CREW I, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 390–91.
Id.
Id.
52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(2)(C) (2018) (emphasis added).
CREW I, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 390.
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“which [independent expenditure]?”51 However, the court noted that “an” is an
intentionally indefinite word that is not designed to be limited in scope.52 If
Congress wanted a narrower scope, it could have used the challenged
regulation’s language, like “the reported independent expenditure” as opposed
to “an independent expenditure.”53 The court determined that indefinite words
such as “an” can be used to intentionally and unambiguously provide an
indefinite scope.54 In doing so, the court found that the FEC’s regulatory
language directly conflicted with FECA’s statutory language. The court
invalidated the FEC’s regulation and ordered the FEC to provide disclosure
guidance in light of the court’s decision.
The district court’s decision regarding the use of “an” was a correct
interpretation of FECA. Even Crossroads conceded that the definition of “an”
depended on the context.55 Moreover, the district court relied on the proposition
that, when applying the first step of Chevron, generality does not necessarily
indicate ambiguity.56 However, in its motion to stay, Crossroads argued that the
D.C. Circuit rejected a similar construction of general terms, such as “an,” by
relying on legislative history and congressional inaction.57
Crossroads’s argument suggested that it wanted the D.C. Circuit to focus
primarily on Chevron step one. However, in response to Crossroads’s
application for an emergency stay pending appeal, the D.C. Circuit rejected
Crossroads’s Chevron step one argument as resting on “(debatable) legislative
history and post-enactment congressional inaction.”58 The court cited multiple
Supreme Court decisions that declined to resort to legislative history when a
statute contained clear language.59 The court also relied on Supreme Court
decisions that declined to consider congressional acquiescence in the absence of
ambiguous language.60 Although Crossroads had a higher burden of proof given
the emergency stay posture, even on appeal it is unlikely that the D.C. Circuit
will accept Crossroads’s Chevron argument.
CREW I is burdensome for agencies and 501(c) organizations, but the
decision is critical for political transparency. CREW I will force the FEC to
develop intricate regulations to manage the influx of donor identification

51. Id. at 403 (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 403–04.
55. Id. at 404.
56. Id. at 405 (citing Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30, 37 (D.D.C. 2000) (rejecting the
approach to Chevron step one analysis that “confuses generality for ambiguity”).
57. See Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion for a Stay
Pending Appeal at 4–5, CREW I, 316 F. Supp. 3d 349 (D.C.C. 2018) (No. 1:16-cv-00259-BAH).
58. CREW v. FEC, 904 F.3d 1014, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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disclosures.61 Though 501(c) organizations will have to make new and
significant disclosures,62 this burden does not outweigh the value of political
transparency. Even the Supreme Court has affirmed that “transparency enables
the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different
speakers and messages.”63
Crossroads is one of many politically motivated nonprofits that utilized the
FEC’s § 109.10 regulatory loophole to avoid disclosures—spending nearly $71
million on independent expenditures in the two years post Citizens United.64
Section 109.10 substantially interfered with transparency, and given that
disclosure is arguably the “least restrictive means” of dealing with dark money
in campaigns, courts are likely to support disclosure requirements.65 In fact, in
response to Crossroads’s emergency motion for a stay pending appeal, the D.C.
Circuit cited Justice Kennedy’s quote in Citizens United when it concluded that
the “the interest in anonymity does not, for purposes of an exceptional stay,
outweigh [CREW I] . . . and the public’s countervailing interests in receiving
important voting information and in transparency.”66 This suggests that it is
unlikely that Crossroads’s arguments will succeed on appeal to the D.C. Circuit.
However, Crossroads may find support from the United State Supreme
Court. On September 15, 2018, Crossroads successfully petitioned a stay from
Chief Justice Roberts.67 Three days later, the Supreme Court vacated Chief
Justice Roberts’ stay.68 Both the stay and order to vacate lack any reasoning,
which makes it difficult to glean anything from the Court’s back and forth.
Some scholars speculate that the Court may hear the decision if the D.C.
Circuit upholds the district court’s.69 Given some of the conservative Justices’
hostility towards campaign finance disclosure laws, it is not unreasonable to
believe that the Court may reverse a decision affirming the district court’s
61. Federal Election Commission’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 35, CREW I, 316 F. Supp.
3d 349 (D.D.C. 2018).
62. Id.
63. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010).
64. FEC MUR 6596 (Crossroads GPS), Statement of Reasons of Vice Chairman Matthew S. Petersen and
Commissioner Caroline C. Hunter at 4 (May 13, 2019), https://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/6596_2.pdf.
65. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (“[D]isclosure requirements certainly in most applications
appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress
found to exist.”).
66. CREW v. FEC, 904 F.3d 1014, 1019 (2018).
67. Order, Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies v. CREW, 139 S. Ct. 5 (2018).
68. Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies v. CREW, 139 S. Ct. 50 (2018).
69. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee & Roberts Barnes, Political Nonprofits Must Now Name Many of Their
Donors Under Ruling After Supreme Court Declines to Intervene, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 18, 2018, 6:55 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-political-nonprofits-donors-20180918-story.html;
Dave
Levinthal & Sarah Kleiner, Supreme Court Lets Stand a Decision Requiring “Dark Money” Disclosure,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/09/supreme-court-lets-stand-adecision-requiring-dark-money-disclosure/570670/; Tim L. Peckinpaugh et al. “Dark Money” Gets a Little
Light: CREW v. FEC and Its Implications for the 2018 Midterms, K&L GATES (Sept. 26, 2018),
http://www.klgates.com/dark-money-gets-a-little-light-crew-v-fec-and-its-implications-for-the-2018midterms-09-26-2018/.
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decision. After all, in Citizens United, Justice Thomas authored a dissenting
opinion that argued that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA)
disclosure requirements were unconstitutional.70 After Justice Gorsuch voted in
line with Justice Thomas in a campaign finance case,71 election law expert
Professor Richard Hasen speculated that Justice Gorsuch could be “as
conservative as Justice Thomas is in these cases.”72 Justice Gorsuch’s vote with
Justice Thomas may indicate a shared view on campaign finance laws, including
disclosure laws. Justice Kavanaugh also expressed some hostility towards
campaign finance disclosure laws. In Independence Institute v. FEC, then Judge
Kavanaugh held that a 501(c)(3) organization’s complaint arguing that portions
of BCRA disclosure laws were unconstitutional contained enough merit to be
entitled to a three-judge tribunal.73 Justice Kavanugh’s decision reveals a belief
that at least some application of campaign finance disclosure laws may be
unconstitutional. However, Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh’s
appointments provide another wrinkle. Both of the newly appointed Justices
have expressed opposition to Chevron deference.74 Thus, Crossroads’s stronger
argument—ambiguity in the statute—may fall on deaf ears.75
In response to CREW I, the FEC issued a press release on October 14, 2018,
providing guidance for future quarterly reports.76 All contributions received
70. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 480 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
71. Republican Party of La. v. FEC, 137 S. Ct. 2178 (2017).
72. Paul Blumenthal, Neil Gorsuch Shows His Hand on Money in Politics As Court Turns Down Big Case,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 22, 2017, 1:38 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/neil-gorsuch-campaignfinance_n_59231990e4b034684b0e7c63 (interviewing campaign finance expert Richard Hasen).
73. Indep. Inst. v. FEC, 816 F.3d 113, 115–16 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
74. Pema Levy, How Brett Kavanaugh Could Cripple the Next Democratic President, MOTHER JONES
(July 24, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/07/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court-chevrondeference/ (excepting portions of Justice Kavanaugh’s speech at the University of Notre Dame regarding the
Chevron doctrine); Eric Citron, The Roots and Limits of Gorsuch’s Views on Chevron Deference, SCOTUSBLOG
(Mar. 17, 2017, 11:26 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/roots-limits-gorsuchs-views-chevrondeference/.
75. Policy arguments would be a substantial factor in the Court’s analysis. Crossroads would likely argue
that disclosure requirements unduly injure the First Amendment rights of 501(c) non-political organizations.
Specifically, Crossroads may compare itself to the petitioner in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, who
suffered a First Amendment injury when Ohio prohibited her from anonymously distributing leaflets to oppose
a ballot proposition. 514 U.S. 334, 337 (1995). In McIntyre, the Court held that the “interest in having
anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring
disclosure as a condition of entry.” Id. at 342. The Court held that Ohio’s interest in preventing libel and fraud
was unfounded because ballot propositions do not present a substantial risk of libel or fraud. Id. at 351–52. Since
Ohio could not demonstrate a sufficient state interest, the Court struck down Ohio’s disclosure law. Id. at 353,
357. Crossroads’s reliance on McIntyre would be misplaced. Unlike the facts in McIntyre, Crossroads and other
501(c) organizations make independent expenditures with the purpose of influencing elections. See FEC MUR
6596 (Crossroads GPS), supra note 64. As McIntyre demonstrates, the government has a much stronger
informational interest in the context of elections as opposed to ballot referendums—the risk of quid pro quo
corruption is much higher in an election than an initiative or referendum. 514 U.S. at 356. Thus, it is unlikely
that Crossroads’s policy argument will persuade the Court since independent expenditures exist for the purpose
of influencing elections as opposed to influencing initiatives.
76. Press Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, FEC Provides Guidance Following U.S. District Court Decision
in CREW v. FEC, 316 F. Supp. 3d 349 (D.D.C. 2018) (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.fec.gov/updates/fec-providesguidance-following-us-district-court-decision-crew-v-fec-316-f-supp-3d-349-ddc-2018/.

GUALCO-NELSON-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/10/20 3:46 PM

1192

[Vol. 71:1181

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

between August 4 and September 18 require a disclosure including the identity
of the person who made any contributions in excess of $250 and who did so with
the purpose of furthering any independent expenditure.77
Returning to the facts in the aforementioned hypothetical, under this
policy, AFAM would be required to disclose the identity of its pharmaceutical
company contributor because the pharmaceutical company contributed with the
purpose of helping John get elected. Theoretically, this helps eliminate
disingenuous 501(c) organizations that are created solely for the purpose of
helping candidates get elected without disclosing the identities of the candidate’s
financial supporters. While CREW I is an important step towards eliminating
dark money in elections, as I will discuss next, it stops short of a robust
transparency directive.
B. THE AFTERMATH OF CREW I
As discussed, CREW I makes it difficult for 501(c) organizations to spend
money on independent expenditures without disclosing their donors’ identities.
Campaign finance advocates, including FEC Commissioner Ellen Weintraub,
praised the decision stating, “[t]his is a real victory for transparency. As a result,
the American people will be better informed about who’s paying for the ads
they’re seeing this election season.”78 Still, some argue that CREW I falls short
of illuminating dark money donors by pointing to disclosure loophole scheme
like the 501(c) shell game.79 The following subpart demonstrates that the
commentators are only partially correct because dark money groups cannot use
the 501(c) shell game to hide their identities after CREW I.
While CREW I compels 501(c) organizations to disclose the identity of its
donors who help contribute and fund any independent expenditure, the
aforementioned commentators believe that CREW I does not apply to a 501(c)
contributing to another 501(c) or super PAC—also known as the 501(c) shell
game.80 Take the Center to Protect Patient Rights. From 2008 to 2012, the Center
to Protect Patient Rights, a conservative 501(c)(4) organization, spent
$94,631,765 in grants to political organizations.81 One such grant included a $4
77. Id.
78. Dave Levinthal & Sarah Kleiner, “Dark Money” in Politics Is About to Get Lighter, CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2018/09/18/22264/dark-money-politics-about-getlighter.
79. See Rick Hasen, Just How Much Will the Crossroads Ruling Change Disclosure Rules for 2018?
Probably Not as Much as You Think, ELECTION L. BLOG (Sept. 20, 2018, 7:28 AM),
https://electionlawblog.org/?p=101234 (arguing that dark money groups can still run issue advertisements and
funnel money through 501(c) organizations in order to remain anonymous); Tim L. Peckinpaugh, et al., supra
note 69; Trevor Potter, Opinion, Supreme Court Leaves in Place Decision that Will Shine a Light on Dark
Money, HILL (Sept. 21, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/407795-supreme-court-leaves-inplace-decision-that-will-shine-a-light-on-dark (noting that neither Congress nor the FEC have required
disclosures for all electioneering communications).
80. See sources cited supra note 79.
81. Follow the Shadow of Dark Money, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/dark-money/shadowinfographic.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
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million grant to another conservative 501(c)(4) organization, Americans for Tax
Reform.82 Americans for Tax Reform, an “educational” tax organization, spent
$15.8 million on independent expenditures throughout the 2012 election cycle.83
Commentators suggest that the Center to Protect Patient Rights could arguably
protect the identities of its donors, as long as it does not spend money directly
on independent expenditures, and instead donates to super PACs or other
organization who would create the independent expenditures.
Contrary to the commentators’ belief, CREW I prevents dark money donors
from hiding their identities by laundering their contributions through a 501(c) to
a super PAC or 501(c) organization. Rather than relying on who uses the money
for the independent expenditure (such as a super PAC or 501(c)), CREW I relies
on the donor’s intent to trigger a disclosure requirement. So long as “the
contributions were made for political purposes to influence any election,” the
501(c) must disclose the donor’s identity.84 CREW I bars the 501(c) shell game
in the context of independent expenditures. The court came to this conclusion
after reviewing Subsection 30104(c)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act,
which states “[e]very person . . . who makes independent expenditures in an
aggregate amount or value in excess of $250 during a calendar year shall file a
statement containing the information required under subsection (b)(3)(A) for all
contributions received by such person.”85 Subsection 30104(b)(3)(A) states that
each report must disclose:
[T]he identification of each . . . person . . . who makes a contribution to the
reporting committee during the reporting period, whose contribution or
contributions have an aggregate amount or value in excess of $200 within
the calendar year . . . or in any lesser amount if the reporting committee
should so elect, together with the date and amount of any such contribution.86

The D.C. District Court concluded that Subsection 30104(c)(1) encompasses
contributions by individuals or groups to a 501(c) that are then routed to
organizations such as super PACs.87 The court explicitly stated that “subsection
(c)(1) covers contributions used for other political purposes in support or
opposition to federal candidates by the [501(c)] organization for contributions
directly to . . . super PACs.”88 Thus, dark money donors cannot hide their
identities by laundering their contributions through a 501(c) to a super PAC or
501(c) organization.
CREW I determined that FECA precludes the 501(c) shell game when the
donor’s goal is to influence a federal election.89 Commentators argue that the

82. Michelle Merlin, Dick Morris’ Super PAC Spends $1.7 M on Conservative Website, OPENSECRETS
(Dec. 7, 2012), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/12/super-pac-for-america/.
83. Id.
84. CREW I, 316 F. Supp. 3d 349, 423 (D.D.C. 2018).
85. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(1) (2018).
86. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3) (emphasis added).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 392.
89. Id.
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district court’s decision does not cover two additional loopholes commonly used
to avoid campaign finance disclosure requirements.90 First, commentators note
that a 501(c) organization does not have to disclose a donation that is used for
the purpose of advocating a specific issue (issue advocacy), as opposed to
influencing an election (express advocacy).91 The CREW I court speculated in
dicta that a 501(c) organization may not be required to disclose issue advocacy
contributions, “[d]onations to [501(c)s] . . . may also be used to engage in issue
advocacy, as opposed to express advocacy. Donors for issue advocacy may not
need to be disclosed.”92 Second, commentators believe that donors can
circumvent CREW I by funneling their money from an LLC into a 501(c)
because it is almost impossible to figure out who created and financed the LLC.93
This loophole is often called the “straw-donor” loophole.94 While CREW I did
not directly address this loophole, the D.C. Circuit recently held that such
corporations and LLCs are subject to the prohibition against straw donors.95 But
the D.C. Circuit did not compel the FEC to immediately enforce the prohibition
on the subject corporation because it was “‘an issue of first impression’ in light
of the Citizens United and SpeechNow rulings . . . .”96 The straw-donor loophole
serves as another example of the FEC’s unwillingness to promote transparency
in campaign finance.
II. 501(C)S IN ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS AND ISSUE ADVOCACY
CREW I does not address 501(c) disclosure requirements in the context of
issue advocacy; in fact, the court intentionally left that issue open.97 Today,
many commentators argue that 501(c)s will avoid disclosure requirements by
using precise language that avoids triggering independent expenditure or
electioneering communication laws.98 Moreover, while FEC regulations address
electioneering communications distributed via broadcast, cable, or satellite
channels, the FEC has not addressed electioneering communications on the
internet. The FEC recently took steps to require disclaimers on internet

90. See, e.g., Follow the Shadow of Dark Money, supra note 81; Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Political Nonprofits
Seek Answers After Court Decision Targeting “Dark Money,” WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2018, 3:14 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/political-nonprofits-seek-answers-after-court-decision-targetingdark-money/2018/09/21/444692f6-bd3f-11e8-8792-78719177250f_story.html?utm_term=.2ebe669dfa79.
91. See Follow the Shadow of Dark Money, supra note 81.
92. CREW I, 316 F. Supp. 3d 349, 423 n.38 (D.D.C. 2018).
93. Lee, supra note 90.
94. See, e.g., Jordan Muller, Here’s What You Need to Know About Shell Companies and Foreign Election
spending, OPENSECRETS (June 28, 2018), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/06/shell-companies-foreignelection-spending/.
95. Democracy 21 v. FEC, 952 F.3d 352, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“The controlling commissioners did not
dispute that § 30122 applies to closely held corporations and corporate LLCs. We agree that it does.” (citation
omitted)).
96. Id. (citation omitted).
97. CREW I, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 423 n.38.
98. See Karl Evers-Hillstrom, Shining a Light on ‘Dark Money’ and Online Ad Spending, OPENSECRETS
(Mar. 14, 2019, 11:53 AM) https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/03/shining-a-light-on-dark-money-ssw/.
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advertisements, but it has not proposed a rule requiring disclosures for internet
advertisements.99 Since PACs and super PACs must disclose the identities of
their donors, a disclaimer requirement will help direct viewers to these
organizations’ disclosure statements that identify individual donors supporting
online electioneering communications.100 However, the same cannot be said for
a 501(c) organization because, as discussed earlier, it is not subject to disclosure
requirements unless it is for an independent expenditure.101 The FEC should
expand the definition of electioneering communications to include internet
advertisements, thereby requiring disclosures for all internet-based
advertisements, not just independent expenditures.102
A. 501(C) PROBLEM IN ISSUE ADVOCACY
CREW I does not address internet disclosure loopholes that, when coupled
with the 501(c) problem, threaten electoral transparency. In order to understand
how internet disclosures laws threaten electoral transparency, it’s worth pausing
to provide context on the differences between issue vs. express advocacy, and
electioneering communications versus independent expenditures.
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court distinguished issue advocacy and express
advocacy.103 Express advocacy is defined as expenditures for “the advocacy of
the election nor defeat of candidates for federal offices,”104 whereas issue
advocacy comprises “expenditures not containing explicit words urging action
in the election.”105 The Court concluded that Congress could not regulate issue
advocacy in the same way it regulates express (campaign) advocacy because it
would result in an impermissible burden on First Amendment rights.106 But
twenty-seven years later the Court abandoned this distinction in McConnell v.
FEC, holding that Buckley did not prohibit Congress from regulating issue
advocacy the same as express advocacy.107 In McConnell, the Court considered
the constitutionality of the BCRA, which imposed disclosure requirements for

99. See Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of “Public Communication,” 83 Fed. Reg.
12864 (proposed Mar. 26, 2018) (codified at 11 C.F.R. § 110, 111 (2020)). A disclaimer often appears on the
bottom of an advertisement and states who paid for the advertisement. A disclosure is made to the governing
agency—the FEC—and states who paid for the advertisement. In other words, disclaimers appear on
advertisements, while disclosures do not.
100. 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a)(4) (2020); 11 CFR § 104.20(b).
101. 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a)(4); 11 CFR § 104.20(b).
102. States Expand Definition of Electioneering Communications to Guard Against Corruption, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 7, 2013) (explaining that states, unlike the federal government, have taken steps to
expand the definition of “electioneering communications” to include internet advertisements).
103. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976)
104. Id. at 205–06.
105. See Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and
Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265, 267 (2000) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at
43–44).
106. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79–80.
107. 540 U.S. 93, 190, 194 (2003).
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“electioneering communications.”108 BCRA’s disclosure provision regulates
electioneering communications, which encompasses some forms of issue
advocacy.109 Electioneering communications include any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication.110 BCRA requires the disclosure of contributions for
electioneering communications, which are advertisements that clearly identify
an electoral candidate within sixty days before a general election and thirty days
before a primary election.111 Congress enacted the electioneering
communication provision because organizations exploited the Buckley issue
versus express advocacy distinction, creating advertisements that were
essentially express advocacy but lacked the “magic words” required by Buckley
to be categorized as such.112 Thus, in McDonnell, the Court concluded that
Congress could enact a provision, like the electioneering communications
provision, to regulate forms of issue advocacy.113
Citizens United affirmed McConnell when it rejected the argument that
“disclosure requirements must be limited to speech that is the functional
equivalent of express advocacy.”114 Yet, organizations can bypass the BCRA’s
requirements by running advertisements outside the thirty- or sixty-day time
frame or by not clearly identifying a candidate. But there’s another glaring
exemption these organizations can exploit that neither the FEC nor BCRA
cover—the internet.
As of now, neither the FEC’s regulations nor the BCRA include internet
advertisements within their definitions of electioneering communications.115
This means that organizations like 501(c)s and super PACs are not subject to
disclosure or disclaimer requirements if they circulate their electioneering
communication on the internet.116 Because organizations are not subject to
disclaimer requirements for internet advertisements, it is difficult for interested
parties to determine who or what funded a particular internet advertisement. At

108. Id. at 194–95. Electioneering communications are distinguishable from independent expenditures in
that independent expenditures require “an expenditure by a person . . . expressly advocating the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17) (2018).
109. See Carrie E. Miller, Parting the Dark Money Sea: Exposing Politically Active Tax-Exempt Groups
Through FEC-IRS Hybrid Enforcement, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341, 351 (2015).
110. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(1) (2018).
111. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3).
112. See States Expand Definition of Electioneering Communications to Guard Against Corruption, supra
note 102.
113. 540 U.S. at 190, 194.
114. 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010).
115. See Matt Corley, Is Big-Spending Non-Profit One Nation Exploiting the Online Ad Loophole?,
CITIZENS FOR RESP. & ETHICS IN WASH. (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.citizensforethics.org/big-spending-nonprofit-one-nation-exploiting-online-ad-loophole/; Megan Janetsky, Low Transparency, Low Regulation Online
Political Ads Skyrocket, OPENSECRETS (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/03/lowtransparency-low-regulation-online-political-ads-skyrocket/; Public Hearings on Internet Disclaimers, FED.
ELECTION COMM’N (July 18, 2018), https://www.fec.gov/updates/public-hearing-internet-disclaimers-2018/.
116. Peter Overby, Federal Election Commission Might Make Disclaimers Mandatory for Online Political
Ads, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 28, 2018, 4:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/28/624416612/federalelection-commission-might-make-disclaimers-mandatory-for-online-politica.

GUALCO-NELSON-71.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

May 2020]

CLOSING DISCLOSURE LOOPHOLES

5/10/20 3:46 PM

1197

least super PACs and political committees must disclose the identities of all their
donors (as long as they contribute more than $200), so while a person may not
know an advertisement’s creator or its contributors, that person will know the
identity of a super PAC or political committee’s donors.117 But, again, 501(c)
organizations are not required to disclose these donors.118 Therefore, unlike
disclosure requirements for independent expenditures, which require a
disclosure for any contributions made to influence an election, online issue
advocacy messages do not fall within electioneering communications’
disclosure requirements.119
Returning to the example in Part I, after CREW I, AFAM can no longer
hide the identity of its donors that want to expressly advocate the election or
defeat of Jane Node. But imagine that instead of creating independent
expenditure advertisements, AFAM’s donors contribute for the purpose of
“persuading voters to change Jane Node’s stance on the Affordable Care Act.”
The election is twenty-nine days away and AFAM wants to roll out
advertisements that clearly identify Jane Node. Under subsection 30104(f),
AFAM cannot hide its donors’ identities because its advertisements will clearly
identify Jane Node within thirty days of the election.120 However, subsection
30104(f) only applies to “broadcast, cable, or satellite” communications.121
AFAM can create an internet advertisement that states, “Tell Jane Node that the
Affordable Care Act is not what the public wants,” and, unlike a super PAC or
political committee, a 501(c)(4) does not have to disclose its source of funding
unless it falls within 30104(c)’s independent expenditure requirements.
To improve transparency, the FEC must close this internet loophole—
particularly given the IRS’s recent decision to eliminate its own disclosure
regulations.122 Up until recently, the FEC required 501(c) organizations to
provide the IRS with the identity of any donor who donated $5000 or more on
the 501(c) organizations’ tax returns.123 Although the IRS redacted the donors’
identities, the agency, on several occasions, failed to redact all the names.124 The
possibility of a failed redaction arguably deterred large donors from donating to
dark money groups. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin responded to this
anxiety in July 2018 by eliminating this disclosure requirement for 501(c)(4) and
501(c)(6) organizations.125 Secretary Mnuchin stated that the decision
constitutes “significant reform to protect personal information.”126 However, the
117. 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a)(4) (2020); 11 CFR § 104.20(b).
118. See supra Part I.
119. See Levinthal & Kleiner, supra note 78.
120. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f) (2018); 11 CFR § 100.29 (2020).
121. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f).
122. Peter Overby, Dark Money Groups Get a Little Darker, Thanks to IRS, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 17,
2018, 4:44 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/17/629823953/dark-money-groups-get-a-little-darker-thanks-toirs.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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Secretary’s decision emboldens 501(c) organizations. In 2014, internet
advertisements made up less than 1% ($71 million) of political ad spending.127
By the 2018 midterms digital advertising increased to $600 million.128 If the IRS
no longer requires 501(c)(4) disclosures, it behooves the FEC to step in and
institute a regulation requiring disclosures.
B. SOLVING THE 501(C) INTERNET LOOPHOLE
The internet loophole may not survive much longer. On March 26, 2018,
the FEC published a notice of proposed rulemaking.129 The proposed rule would
require internet advertisements to contain a disclaimer that identified the
advertisement’s creator.130 Disclaimers are different from disclosures.
Disclaimers provide the identity of the advertisement’s major donors on the
actual advertisement; whereas disclosures are publicly submitted to the
supervising agency, the FEC, but and are not listed on the actual advertisement.
While the FEC’s proposed rule does not include disclosures, it symbolizes a shift
in the FEC’s focus to internet-based political activity. In fact, the FEC created a
new term called “public communications” that encompasses “communications
placed for a fee on another person’s website.”131 By implementing this proposed
rule, the FEC acknowledges the importance of political transparency on the
internet.
The FEC can close the internet loophole by adopting a regulation that
expands the definition of “electioneering communication” to include its newly
proposed term “public communications.”132 The FEC’s current regulatory
proposal defines “public communications” as, “a communication by means of
any . . . general public political advertising. . . . [t]he term general public
political advertising shall not include communications over the Internet, except
for the communications placed for a fee on another person’s Web site.”133
Congress gave the FEC the authority to make or amend rules as “necessary to
carry out the provisions” of Congress’s statute.134 The FEC should amend its
electioneering communication definition to state: “Electioneering
communication means any broadcast, cable, satellite or public communication
127. Janetsky, supra note 115.
128. 2018 Political Digital Advertising Report, TECH FOR CAMPAIGNS, https://www.techforcampaigns.org/
2018-political-digital-advertising-report (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). There are a couple of important and
interesting things to note about this source. First, it only sampled sixty campaigns in the election cycle to
conclude that these campaigns spent $600 million on digital advertising, which suggests that the amounts are
much higher. Id. Second, over 90% of political advertisements were delivered to mobile phones rather than
desktop devices. Id.
129. Public Hearing on Internet Disclaimers, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (July 18, 2018),
https://www.fec.gov/updates/public-hearing-internet-disclaimers-2018/.
130. Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of “Public Communication,” 83 Fed. Reg. 12864
(proposed Mar. 26, 2018) (codified at 11 C.F.R. § 110, 111 (2020)).
131. For a current definition, see 11 C.F.R. § 100.26 (2020).
132. Public Hearing on Internet Disclaimers, supra note 129.
133. 11 C.F.R. § 100.26.
134. 52 U.S.C. § 30107(a)(8) (2018).
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as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 100.26.” By ratifying this new definition, all public
communications, including paid internet activity, will be subject to the same
disclosure laws as electioneering communications. Since electioneering
communication disclosure requirements force all persons, including 501(c)s, to
disclose the identity of their contributors, 501(c) donors would be subject to the
spotlight. Utilizing this pathway, the FEC could eliminate the possibility of an
internet loophole for electioneering communications.
III. THE LLC TO 501(C) STRAW-DONOR INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE
LOOPHOLE
The commentators who claimed that CREW I would not completely
eliminate dark money in elections were not entirely wrong.135 During the 2016
presidential election, Donald Trump’s political committee raised $10.6 million
from LLCs.136 Individuals set up these LLCs to hide their identity.137
Theoretically, a foreign agent could set up an LLC, incorporate it in Delaware,
and make contributions to super PACs and political committees without the
public learning that the money came from a foreign source.138 FECA permits the
FEC to investigate these “straw-donor” violations, but the commission often
fails to garner enough votes to commence an investigation.139 In order to compel
the FEC to investigate straw-donor violations, courts must conclude that the
FEC’s decision not to investigate an alleged straw-donor violation was contrary
to law.140
A. CREATING A SHELL LLC TO PROTECT THE DONOR’S IDENTITY
Delaware’s corporate law protects the identity of an LLC founder or
managing member.141 Many individuals use LLCs as shells to contribute to super
PACs and 501(c) organizations.142 Some non-profits, like the Campaign Legal
Center (CLC), promote political transparency by filing complaints with the FEC

135. See sources cited supra note 79.
136. Ashley Balcerzak, Surge in LLC Contributions Brings More Mystery About True Donors,
OPENSECRETS (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2017/04/surge-in-llc-contributions-moremystery/.
137. Id.
138. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York indicted Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman
for this precise type of straw-donor scheme. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Lev
Parnas and Igor Fruman Charged with Conspiring to Violate Straw and Foreign Donor Bans (Oct. 10, 2019)
[hereinafter Parnas and Frugman Indictment], https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/lev-parnas-and-igorfruman-charged-conspiring-violate-straw-and-foreign-donor-bans.
139. See, e.g., Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 312 F. Supp. 3d 153, 153 (D.D.C. 2017).
140. Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
141. Libby Watson, Why Are There so Many Anonymous Companies in Delaware?, SUNLIGHT FOUND.
(Apr. 6, 2016, 12:59 PM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2016/04/06/why-are-there-so-many-anonymouscorporations-in-delaware/.
142. See Rebecca Ballhaus, New Path for Masking PAC Donors, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2016, 11:48 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-path-for-masking-super-pac-donors-1454546712; see also Parnas and
Frugman Indictment, supra note 138.
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alleging that anonymous donors use LLCs to circumvent disclosure
requirements.143 These situations are known as “straw-donor” cases, and are
illegal under FECA.144 However, up until Campaign Legal Center & Democracy
21 v. FEC (“Democracy 21”),145 courts have historically applied the straw-donor
statutory provisions to individuals who make donations in the name of another
individual, not LLCs.146 FECA prohibits individuals from using someone else’s
name to donate to a political campaign.147 FECA also prohibits the recipient
from accepting a donation that they know is from a different individual.148 If an
LLC donates to a super PAC or 501(c) organization for the purpose of
influencing an election, the super PAC or 501(c) can only disclose the name of
the LLC because states like Delaware protect the identities of the individuals
behind the LLC.149 Therefore, individual donors can hide their identities by
laundering their donations through a shell LLC.
Circling back to the example in Part I, imagine a donor wants to create an
independent expenditure that denounces Jane Node, but the donor does not want
their name on the advertisement. After learning about the recent CREW I
decision, the donor decides to funnel their money through a shell LLC to a super
PAC. The donor creates “Accountability LLC” and leaves $1 million in its
general treasury fund. Accountability LLC then donates a large sum to AFAM’s
sister super PAC, Citizens Against Archaic Medicine (CAAM). In accordance
with FECA and the FEC’s regulations, CAAM discloses that Accountability
LLC donated a large sum, but CAAM does not disclose the wealthy donor’s
name. The donor achieved their goal of anonymously spreading their message.
Thus, the FEC and public only know that Accountability LLC made the
donation, not the actual identity of the human donor.
B. COMPELLING THE FEC TO INVESTIGATE STRAW-DONOR VIOLATIONS
Under FECA, the FEC has the authority to investigate and determine if an
individual violated FECA’s straw-donor laws.150 Many commentators criticize
the FEC for routinely failing to probe straw-donor complaints due to political
143. CLC v. FEC (Straw Donors), CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., https://campaignlegal.org/
cases-actions/clc-v-fec-straw-donor (last updated June 6, 2018).
144. Democracy 21 v. FEC, 952 F.3d 352, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Alex Glorioso, An FEC Warning on LLC
Gifts to Super PACs?, OPENSECRETS (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/04/an-fecwarning-on-llc-gifts-to-super-pacs/ (citing the statements from commissioners stating that “closely held
corporations and corporate LLCs may be considered straw donors” in violation of the law).
145. 952 F.3d 352 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
146. 52 U.S.C. § 30122 (2018); see United States v. Whittemore, 776 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015);
Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 119, 129 (D.D.C. 2017) (arguing in favor of treating shell LLCs
as straw donors).
147. 52 U.S.C. § 30122.
148. Id.
149. See Watson, supra note 141. But see Peter J. Henning, Is This the End of the Anonymous Shell
Companies? Not Too Fast, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/business/
dealbook/llc-shell-companies-money-laundering.html.
150. 52 U.S.C. § 30122.
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deadlock.151 Until recently, the FEC has never initiated an enforcement action
in response to a complaint alleging that someone is using an LLC as a straw
donor,152 despite the Department of Justice’s belief that an LLC can be used as
a straw donor.153 On March 13, 2020, the D.C. Circuit concluded that
corporations are subject to FECA’s straw-donor prohibition.
In 2016, CLC filed a complaint with the FEC alleging that Richard
Stephenson, a wealthy investment banker, in tandem with two other people,
made more than $12 million in contributions to a super PAC called Freedom
Works for America.154 The FEC’s general counsel recommended that the FEC
investigate the case.155 Instead of deferring to the FEC’s general counsel, three
members of the FEC concluded that the agency should not investigate the
complaint.156 Since the remaining commissioners could not get the necessary
four votes to order an investigation, the FEC closed CLC’s case.157 Once again,
the FEC deadlocked on partisan grounds—seemingly never-ending pattern in
which Democrat appointees vote with fellow Democrat and Republican
appointees vote with fellow Republicans.158
In response to the deadlock, CLC sued, arguing that FECA entitles the
public to election-related information.159 The FEC filed a motion to dismiss on
the theory that CLC had not suffered an injury.160 The district court disagreed,
concluding that FECA gives CLC the right to “truthful information regarding
campaign contributions and expenditures.”161 Thus, the FEC’s motion to dismiss
failed because a failure to provide information satisfies the “particularized
injury” requirement of standing.162
Campaign Legal Center provides two significant takeaways. First, courts
can still actively compel the FEC to investigate disclosure violations. In a
subsequent decision, the D.C. District gave CLC the opportunity to demonstrate
that the FEC’s decision to preclude straw-donor violation investigations
constituted arbitrary and capricious conduct that is contrary to FECA.163 While
the court ultimately held that the FEC’s decision did not amount to conduct that
was contrary to law,164 the court’s refusal to dismiss the claim for lack of injury
151. See Anthony J. Gaughan, Trump, Twitter, and the Russians: The Growing Obsolescence of Federal
Campaign Finance Law, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 79, 112 (2017).
152. See Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 312 F. Supp. 3d 153, 158 (D.D.C. 2017) (citation omitted).
153. See, e.g., Parnas and Frugman Indictment, supra note 138.
154. Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 119, 126–27 (D.D.C. 2017).
155. Id. at 127.
156. Id. at 123.
157. Id.
158. In fact, a recent investigation determined that Democrat appointees voted together 87% of the time,
while Republican appointees voted as a bloc 98% of the time. Thompson, supra note 9.
159. Campaign Legal Ctr., 245 F. Supp. 3d at 123.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting All. for Democracy v. FEC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 138,
144 (D.D.C. 2005)).
162. Id. at 129.
163. See, e.g., Campaign Legal Ctr., 312 F. Supp. 3d at 161.
164. Id. at 161.
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demonstrates the court’s understanding that LLC straw-donor schemes can
cause an injury to the public. This case provides a roadmap to organizations like
CLC to engage the FEC on the merits of these disputes—a costly endeavor that
may prompt an agency to settle and provide some amount of information rather
than spend time and money in court.
Second, and more generally, both CREW I and Campaign Legal Center
demonstrate that the FEC will consistently fail to address dark money issues.
The FEC’s partisan gridlock makes it an inefficient government agency,
especially since, at the time of this publication, only three of six seats are
filled.165 Four are needed in order to have a quorum.166 In 2016, former
Commissioner Ann Ravel resigned from the FEC and explained she did so, in
part, because of the FEC’s absolute failure to address dark money issues.167 In
her resignation letter, former Commissioner Ravel admonished the FEC stating,
“Disclosure laws need to be strengthened . . . and Commissioners who will carry
out the mandates of the law should be appointed to the expired terms at the
FEC.”168 If the FEC keeps failing to carry out its statutory mandate, it will be up
to the courts to use administrative law doctrines to correct the agency’s failures.
But within the D.C. Circuit, the courts are split as to whether they must
review the FEC’s decision. In CREW II, the majority balked at the suggestion
that the judiciary should interfere and/or overrule the FEC’s prosecutorial
discretion.169 “[I]f an action is committed to the agency’s discretion under
APA § 701(a)(2)—as agency enforcement decisions are—there can be no
judicial review for abuse of discretion, or otherwise.”170 This remains a
contested decision amongst D.C. Circuit judges. Recently, in Democracy 21,
Judge Edwards echoed Judge Pillard’s dissent in Crew II by rebuking the idea
that courts could not review exercises of the FEC’s prosecutorial discretion.171
Judge Edwards acknowledged that exercises of prosecutorial discretion are
typically unreviewable, per the Supreme Court’s decision in Heckler v. Chaney,
but raised the Court’s caveat in FEC v. Atkins.172 In Atkins the Court also
recognized that exercises of prosecutorial discretion are unreviewable, but
concluded that “[FECA] explicitly indicates the contrary. . . . [Respondents]
may bring this petition for a declaration that the FEC’s dismissal of their
165. Shane Goldmacher, The Federal Election Commission Needs 4 of 6 Members to Enforce the Law. It
Now Has 3, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/us/politics/federal-electioncommission.html.
166. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a) (2018).
167. Ann Ravel, Departing the Federal Election Commission, MEDIUM (Feb. 19, 2017),
https://medium.com/@AnnMRavel/departing-the-federal-election-commission-fee0ae9d63a1 (quoting from
former Commissioner Ravel’s resignation letter to President Donald Trump).
168. Id.
169. See generally CREW II, 892 F.3d 434, 434 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding that the courts cannot review the
FEC’s decision not to investigate a potential campaign finance violation if the FEC’s decision rests on the basis
of prosecutorial discretion).
170. Id. at 441.
171. Democracy 21 v. FEC, 952 F.3d 352, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Edwards, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 360–61.
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complaint was unlawful.”173 To conclude otherwise would enable the FEC to
use “prosecutorial discretion” as a pretextual talisman to drive away
inconvenient judicial review. FECA even contains a provision authorizing
judicial review. Also known as the citizen-suit provision, 52
U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) states that a district court:
In any proceeding under this paragraph the court may declare that the
dismissal of the complaint or the failure to act is contrary to law, and may
direct the Commission to conform with such declaration within 30 days,
failing which the complainant may bring, in the name of such complainant,
a civil action to remedy the violation involved in the original complaint.174

This provision suggests that Congress implicitly authorized courts to review an
agency’s decision not to undertake an enforcement action even if its decision
was based on an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. If the court determines that
the FEC’s decision was contrary to law, then it will give the FEC a chance to
conform its decision to the law before authorizing a private citizen to file a
private right of action. Until recently the courts had never permitted a citizen
suit since FECA’s passage in 1976.175
In CREW v. American Action Network (AAN), the D.C. District Court held
that CREW could proceed with their citizen suit against AAN.176 A citizen-suit
is permissible if the FEC fails to abide by a court order finding a dismissal of a
complaint “contrary to law” based on an erroneous interpretation of FECA.177
CREW filed a complaint with the FEC claiming that AAN operated as an
unregistered political committee.178 The FEC dismissed the complaint twice on
the grounds that AAN had not violated FECA, and after each dismissal, the
district court reversed and remanded to the FEC with instructions.179 Because
the FEC repeatedly failed to comply with the court’s instructions, CREW filed
a citizen-suit against AAN in the D.C. District Court, which circumvented the
FEC’s review.180 AAN moved to dismiss CREW’s lawsuit, under the theory that
the D.C. Circuit prohibited judicial review of the FEC’s prosecutorial
discretion.181
The court determined that the FEC’s rejection of CREW’s complaint was
not an exercise of prosecutorial discretion because the FEC based its decision
on an interpretation of FECA, which qualifies for judicial review.182 The court
noted that the FEC’s occasional reference to prosecutorial discretion cannot
173. 524 U.S. 11, 26 (1998).
174. CREW II, 892 F.3d. at 437 (alterations in original) (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) (2018)).
175. Kenneth P. Doyle, Watchdog Allowed to Sue on Donor Disclosure After FEC Won’t Act, BLOOMBERG
GOV’T (Oct. 1, 2019), https://about.bgov.com/news/watchdog-allowed-to-sue-on-donor-disclosure-after-fecwont-act/.
176. No. 18-cv-945 (CRC), 2019 WL 4750248, at *1 (D.D.C. 2019).
177. Id. at *17.
178. Id. at *3.
179. Id. at *17.
180. Id.
181. Id. at *8–9.
182. Id. at *8–9.
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outweigh an administrative opinion grounded almost solely in legal
arguments—substance matters more than form.183 Because the FEC’s dismissals
were based on legal arguments rather than prosecutorial discretion, the court
could review the FEC’s decisions, remand with instructions, and, if the FEC did
not abide by the instructions, permit CREW to file a citizen suit.184
AAN is an important step toward political transparency. First, the court’s
dissatisfaction with the FEC’s deadlock suggests that courts may, where
possible, transfer some of the FEC’s authority to citizen-suits. This sentiment is
reflected Judge Cooper’s glib remark that “[t]he Federal Election Commission
is the only government agency that does exactly what Congress designed it to
do: nothing.”185 Second, while a court’s authority to review decisions based on
FEC prosecutorial discretion remains up-in-the-air, AAN reflects the courts’
ability to parse through the FEC’s pretextual use of prosecutorial discretion to
bar judicial review. Third, AAN presents an opportunity for dissatisfied FEC
Commissioners to circumvent partisan deadlock. AAN includes an analysis of
the FEC’s genuine motivations for dismissing CREW’s complaint, rather than
simply deferring to pretextual “prosecutorial discretion” justification.186
Commissioners that have expressed dissatisfaction with their colleagues’
decision not to vote in favor of an enforcement action could sign on to these
decisions and articulate legal, as opposed to discretionary, reasons for not
initiating enforcement actions. Even under CREW II, the legal basis for rejecting
an enforcement action would trigger the district court’s authority to review such
decisions to ascertain (1) whether the FEC’s proclaimed discretionary reasons
for not initiating an action are genuine, and (2) whether the FEC’s interpretation
of FECA is contrary to law. The courts’ increased role in litigating FEC
enforcement matters may prompt Congress to pass legislation to remove the
FEC’s design defect and promote transparency in our elections.
CONCLUSION
Anonymous spending continues to permeate elections in the United States.
Instead of combating dark money in federal elections, the FEC remains
paralyzed and divided. The FEC also continues to misinterpret and misapply
FECA’s mandate, demonstrated by the recent cases CREW I, Campaign Legal
Center, and AAN. Two years after foreign intelligence reports demonstrated that
foreign actors relied heavily on the internet in federal elections, the FEC
proposed a rule to require disclaimers—but not disclosures—on digital political

183. Id. at *11.
184. Id. at *12.
185. Id. at *1. The court goes on to correct one thing that the quote mischaracterizes: Congress did not
actually design the FEC to do nothing.
186. Id. at *11.
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advertisements.187 The FEC’s proposed rule is a step in the right direction but
does not go far enough.
To combat dark money, the FEC must address internet disclosure loopholes
and investigate straw-donor schemes. The FEC can address the internet
disclosure loophole by promulgating a regulation that expands the definition of
electioneering communications to include public communications. To combat
straw-donor schemes, the solution is simpler. The FEC should investigate
potential violations of 52 U.S.C. § 30122. It is unlikely that the FEC will address
these issues in the near future—it does not even have enough commissioners for
a quorum. The courts and transparency interest groups must hold the FEC
accountable, even when the FEC asserts prosecutorial discretion as a basis for
choosing not to authorize enforcement actions. CREW I, Campaign Legal
Center, and AAN demonstrate that this remains a viable option.

187. Nicholas Fandos & Kevin Roose, Facebook Identifies an Active Political Influence Campaign Using
Fake Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/us/politics/facebookpolitical-campaign-midterms.html.
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